Home › Govern Agentic Charter Matrix
NIST CSF 2.0 · Govern (GV) · 5 concerns × 3 layers
Who is allowed to put this agent into the world, under what authority, accountable to what policy, with what retirement criteria?
Concern
In-agent advisory
Client-side deterministic
Server-side external Identity Who can authorize creation? Who is the named human owner accountable for this agent's actions? 0 artifacts Named human owner accountable for the agent's actions. Backup owner identified. Identity claims tied to charter via registered agent identifier. not in this matrix 0 artifacts AI Acceptable Use Policy names categories of agents allowed to exist. AI Governance Council holds authority to create new agent classes. Director of AI Workforce Transformation is the named … Authorization What scope does the charter grant? Under what change-control process can scope be expanded? 0 artifacts Specific authorized scope. Named tools, MCP servers, environments, max-blast-radius. Scope expansion requires re-signature. not in this matrix 0 artifacts AI Risk Appetite Statement defines hard prohibitions and change-control process for evolving scope policy. Blast radius What risk tier? What damage cap is acceptable? Under what conditions does the charter permit production access? 0 artifacts Specific risk tier, specific damage cap (records-per-session, USD-per-day, forbidden ops), conditions for tier downgrade or retirement. not in this matrix 0 artifacts Org-wide risk tier taxonomy (1 read-only, 2 scoped writes, 3 destructive, 4 production-critical) with damage caps and matching control requirements. Approval gating Who must approve the charter itself? Who approves changes to it? Who approves retirement? 0 artifacts Charter signed by owner, domain authority, and (Tier 3+) security review. Charter identifies approver of every subsequent scope change. Annual review cadence. Emergency revocation conditions… not in this matrix 0 artifacts AI Governance Council approves new agent classes, ratifies risk-tier policy. Member roles named (CISO, Chief AI Officer, GC, Privacy, Domain Leads). Quorum and voting rules defined. Supply chain What models, MCP servers, dependencies, base images is the charter allowed to use? Under what change-control? 0 artifacts Specific dependencies declared. Named foundation model and version, named MCP servers (with hashes from Covenants L2-C5), named base images, named tool versions. Dependency changes require c… not in this matrix 0 artifacts Org-wide allowlist of approved foundation models. Org-wide policy on MCP server approval, third-party dependency approval, vendor risk assessment integrated with procurement.
Walk a row left to right and ask one question at each layer: if the agent decides to
violate this concern, what stops it here ? All three populated is defense in depth. Only the
in-agent cell populated is an audit finding, because the model can be talked out of it.