Agentic Covenants

Agentic Restorations Matrix

NIST CSF 2.0 · Recover (RC) · 5 concerns × 3 layers

How do I get back to a known-good state and not repeat this?
Concern In-agent advisory Client-side deterministic Server-side external
IdentityRotate credentials, re-issue per-agent identities, regenerate trust relationships.empty by design(no enforcement)1 artifactRegenerate credential file with strict ACLs, rotate OIDC client secret, re-authenticate operator host to SSO, verify ACLs survived.1 artifactDisable old ServiceAccount, recreate from declarative source, rotate IAM keys, re-establish OIDC trust policy, re-issue SPIFFE identity, verify no inherited permissions.
AuthorizationRebuild RBAC and IAM from declarative source. Audit for drift introduced during the incident.empty by design(no enforcement)1 artifactRestore local hook config from VCS, verify file ownership and ACLs, reinstall pre-commit hooks, verify Claude Code is on the patched version.2 artifactsReapply RBAC, Kyverno, IAM from declarative source; audit for drift between cluster state and source.
Blast radiusRestore data, redeploy infrastructure, rebuild from clean state.empty by design(no enforcement)1 artifactRebuild operator host from known-good image if untrusted, reinstall agent runtime with signature verification, re-derive sandbox profiles.1 artifactRestore data from immutable backups verified pre-incident, redeploy IaC, reapply NetworkPolicy and ResourceQuota.
Approval gatingRe-enable branch protection, audit bypass events, harden gates that were exploited.empty by design(no enforcement)1 artifactRestore PreToolUse config from VCS, reapply tier definitions, re-enable Auto Mode, re-establish out-of-band channel.2 artifactsRe-enable branch protection (enforce_admins true), re-add CODEOWNERS, audit bypass events from incident, unfreeze deployments only after rest of recovery is verified.
Supply chainRe-pin dependencies, regenerate SBOMs, re-verify signatures, rebuild from clean source.empty by design(no enforcement)1 artifactReinstall agent runtime with signature verification, re-pin MCP hashes from clean source, regenerate lockfiles from declared deps.1 artifactRebuild and re-sign images, regenerate SBOMs, rotate signing key if exposed, force redeploy with new SHA pins.

Walk a row left to right and ask one question at each layer: if the agent decides to violate this concern, what stops it here? All three populated is defense in depth. Only the in-agent cell populated is an audit finding, because the model can be talked out of it.