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Agentic Interventions Matrix
NIST CSF 2.0 · Respond (RS) · 5 concerns × 3 layers
How do I stop the bleeding now?
Concern
In-agent advisory
Client-side deterministic
Server-side external
Identity Revoke the credential, kill the session. empty by design (no enforcement; the agent that misuses identity will not voluntarily revoke it) 1 artifact Kill agent process tree, delete local credential file, force re-authentication on next launch, logout SSO session on the operator host. 2 artifacts Revoke OIDC token at IdP, disable ServiceAccount, rotate IAM keys, attach deny-all IAM policy, invalidate all active sessions. Authorization Shrink permissions to nothing. empty by design (no enforcement) 3 artifacts Force-replace local hook config with deny-all, lock with chattr +i, kill running agent. 3 artifacts Apply emergency Kyverno deny-all, replace agent Role with empty rules, attach IAM deny-all, Git pre-receive reject. Blast radius Contain the in-flight damage. empty by design (no enforcement) 1 artifact kill -KILL the agent process tree, tear down sandbox, optionally network-isolate operator host, docker stop or kubectl delete pod. 3 artifacts Apply emergency NetworkPolicy default-deny, scale Deployment to zero, force-delete pods, optionally cordon node, block egress at cloud firewall. Approval gating Lock down all approval surfaces. empty by design (no enforcement) 1 artifact Replace approval hook with deny-all, disable Auto Mode classifier, disable judgment-query escalation channel, force out-of-band on every action. 3 artifacts Lock branch protection (revoke bypass perms, raise required reviewers), pause CI/CD, engage deployment freeze, lock GitHub environments. Supply chain Quarantine packages, halt distribution. empty by design (no enforcement) 1 artifact Remove suspect MCP server from allowlist, quarantine downloaded packages to restricted location, lock lockfile, pin runtime to last-known-good, kill agent. 3 artifacts Remove poisoned image from registry, deploy emergency Kyverno deny rule on signature, block compromised registry/MCP domain at network/DNS, force redeploy with last-known-good image SHA pinn…
Walk a row left to right and ask one question at each layer: if the agent decides to
violate this concern, what stops it here ? All three populated is defense in depth. Only the
in-agent cell populated is an audit finding, because the model can be talked out of it.