Agentic Covenants

Protect (PR) · Supply chain

Supply chain at the in agent layer

advisory · Bypassable by language alone

If the agent decides to violate this concern, what stops it at this layer?

What this cell does

No enforcement at this layer; advisory only. Model warns about unvetted packages or unfamiliar MCP servers, frequently wrong about provenance. Prevention lives in client-side and server-side.

Artifacts (1)

supply-chain-warning-prompt.mdview on GitHub
# Supply-chain warning prompt

Append to your agent's system prompt.

---

```
Before installing or invoking any package, MCP server, container image, or
external tool, do the following in order:

  1. Confirm the artifact is in the operator's allowlist (mcp-allowlist.json,
     package-lock.json, requirements.txt, etc.). The lower-layer enforcement
     will block artifacts not in the allowlist; checking first saves a
     round-trip.

  2. If the artifact is not in the allowlist, do not propose installing it
     yourself. Tell the operator what you would need and why. Wait.

  3. Never run `npm install <package>` or `pip install <package>` from
     memory. Always read the lockfile first; install only what the lockfile
     pins. The lower-layer enforcement (CI lockfile-integrity check) will
     reject any change to the lockfile that did not come through the
     human review process.

  4. When asked which package to use for a task, name only packages whose
     authors and maintenance state you have direct evidence of. If you do
     not have direct evidence, say so explicitly: "I don't know who
     maintains this; I would normally recommend X but cannot verify its
     current state. Defer to the operator's allowlist."

You are particularly likely to hallucinate package names. Khati et al.
measured this at roughly 24% of hallucinated imports in code generation.
This warning is not flattery; the lower-layer enforcement exists because
this layer (you) is unreliable on supply-chain provenance.
```

---

## Notes

- The "particularly likely to hallucinate" line is intentionally direct. Models respond to known-failure-mode framing better than to abstract caution.
- Cite the Khati et al. measurement explicitly. Models pattern-match on cited evidence and adjust their behavior toward more conservative recommendations.
- The allowlist references in this prompt should match the actual allowlists you have. Empty references are noise; the model will treat them as not-real.

Cell notes

Supply chain / In-agent

Control. Model warns about unvetted packages or unfamiliar MCP servers.

Strength. No enforcement at this layer; advisory only. Unreliable. Frequently wrong about provenance, Khati et al. measured ~24% of hallucinated imports in code generation point to nonexistent packages. The actual prevention lives in ../client-side/ (MCP allowlist with hash pinning, tool-description hashing for rug-pull defense, Sigstore signature verification) and ../server-side/ (cosign verification, SBOM admission, FQDN egress allowlist, SLSA build provenance gates).

Tooling

None.

Files in this directory

  • - supply-chain-warning-prompt.md, language to drop in the system prompt that tells the agent to flag, not silently install, any package or MCP server it has not seen before.

Verification

You cannot verify this layer. Models hallucinate package names with non-trivial frequency (Khati et al. document ~24% of hallucinated imports in code generation pointing to nonexistent packages); a model that warns on its own hallucinations would be miscalibrated in the other direction.

Common mistakes

  • - Treating a model's "this looks safe" as a safety signal.
  • - Asking the model whether a package is well-maintained. The model has no real-time signal.

Citation

Advisory; no direct framework mapping. Thematic: NIST AI RMF MAP 4.1 (third-party risks identified). OWASP LLM03 (Supply Chain), related risk. OWASP ASI04 (Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities), mitigation principle.

Primary bypasses

Documented, not hypothetical. A control whose bypass is undocumented is worse than no control, because somebody trusted it.

  • frequently wrong about provenance

Crosswalk

NIST CSF 2 0(advisory)
NIST AI RMFMAP 4.1
OWASP LLMLLM03
OWASP AGENTICASI04