Govern (GV) · Supply chain
Supply chain at the in agent layer
advisory · Bypassable by language alone
Who is allowed to put this agent into the world, under what authority, accountable to what policy, with what retirement criteria?
What this cell does
Specific dependencies declared. Named foundation model and version, named MCP servers (with hashes from Covenants L2-C5), named base images, named tool versions. Dependency changes require charter amendment.
Cell notes
Charter, Supply chain / Agent
Structural question. Does the agent charter declare specific dependencies (named foundation model, MCP servers with hashes, base image digest, runtime version), and require charter amendment for changes?
Owner. Named human owner. Counter-signed by domain authority.
Template fragment
The dependencies: block of ../../templates/agent-charter.yaml:
dependencies:
foundation_model: claude-opus-4-8
foundation_model_pinned_at: 2026-04-15
mcp_server_hashes:
filesystem: sha256:REPLACE_WITH_ACTUAL_SHA256
github: sha256:REPLACE_WITH_ACTUAL_SHA256
base_image: ghcr.io/example-org/claude-agent
base_image_digest: sha256:REPLACE_WITH_DIGEST_FROM_CRANE
agent_runtime_version: 2.1.40
pinned_at: 2026-04-15
Audit prompts
- - For [agent X], does the charter
mcp_server_hashesmatch the runtimecontrols/supply-chain/client-side/mcp-allowlist.jsonentries? - - Does
base_image_digestmatch the deployed pod's resolved digest? - - When was each dependency last pinned? When was it last reviewed?
Operational tie-in
- -
mcp_server_hashesis the source-of-truth forcontrols/supply-chain/client-side/mcp-allowlist.json. Drift between charter and allowlist is a Sentinels finding. - -
base_image_digestis the value that should be pinned incontrols/identity/server-side/pod-with-projected-token.yamland verified bycontrols/supply-chain/server-side/kyverno-verify-image-signatures.yaml. - -
agent_runtime_version: 2.1.40is the May 2026 PreToolUse precedence patch line, pre-patch versions of Claude Code allow the deny-bypass regression. The charter must reflect the patched version.
Common failure mode
Manifest is updated in Charter but allowlist hashes in Covenants L2-C5 are not regenerated. Charter and runtime drift apart. Charter says one model, agent uses another. The fix is automation that derives the runtime allowlist from the charter file at deploy time.
Citation
NIST CSF 2.0 GV.SC-07; ID.RA-09 (authenticity and integrity assessed prior to acquisition). NIST AI RMF GOVERN 6.2, MAP 4.1. ISO/IEC 42001 §A.10. EU AI Act Art. 25. OWASP MCP04, MCP09.
Crosswalk
| NIST CSF 2 0 | GV.SC-07, ID.RA-09 |
|---|---|
| NIST AI RMF | GOVERN 6.2, MAP 4.1 |
| ISO IEC 42001 | §A.10 |
| EU AI ACT | Art. 25 |
| OWASP MCP | MCP04, MCP09 |
Cite this cell:
https://agenticcovenants.com/govern/supply-chain/in-agent/